Abstract. In this paper we study boolean game with prioritized norms. Norms distinguish illegal strategies from legal strategies. Notions like legal strategy and legal Nash equilibrium are introduced. Our formal model is a combination of (weighted) boolean game and so called (prioritized) input/output logic. After formally presenting the model, we use examples to show that non-optimal Nash equilibrium can be avoided by making use of norms. We study various complexity issues related to legal strategy and legal Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
The study of the interplay of games and norms can be divided into two main branches: the first, mostly originating from economics and game theory [11, 19, 20] , treats norms as mechanisms that enforce desirable properties of social interactions; the second, that has its roots in social sciences and evolutionary game theory [29, 12] views norms as (Nash or correlated) equilibrium that results from the interaction of rational agents. A survey of the interaction between games and norms can be found in Grossi et al [15] . This paper belongs to the first branch.
In this paper we study the combination of boolean games and norms. Boolean game is a class of games based on propositional logic. It was firstly introduced by Harrenstein et al. [17] and further developed by several researchers [16, 23, 13, 9, 7, 26] . In a boolean game, each agent i is assumed to have a goal, represented by a propositional formula φ i over some set of propositional variables P. Each agent i is associated with some subset P i of the variables, which are under the unique control of agent i. The choices, or strategies, available to i correspond to all the possible assignment of truth or falsity to the variables in P i . An agent will try to choose an assignment so as to satisfy his goal φ i . Strategic concerns arise because whether i's goal is in fact satisfied will depend on the choices made by other agents.
Norms are social rules regulating agents' behavior by prescribing which actions are obligatory, forbidden or permitted. In the game theoretical setting, norms distinguish illegal strategies form legal strategies. By designing norms appropriately, non-optimal equilibrium might be avoided. To represent norms in boolean games, we need a logic of norms, which has been extensively studied in the deontic logic community.
Various deontic logic has been developed since von Wright's first paper [30] in this area. In the first volume of the handbook of deontic logic [14] , input/output logic [21, 22] appears as one of the new achievement in deontic logic in recent years. Input/output logic takes its origin in the study of conditional norms. The basic idea is: norms are conceived as a deductive machine, like a black box which produces normative statements as output, when we feed it factual statements as input.
In this paper we use a simplification of Parent's prioritized input/output logic [25] as the logic of norms. Given a normative multi-agent system, which contains a boolean game, a set of prioritized norms and certain environment. Every strategy of every agent is classified as legal or illegal. Notions like legal Nash equilibrium are then naturally defined.
The structure of this paper is the following: We present some background knowledge, including boolean game, input/output logic and complexity theory in Section 2. Normative multi-agent system are introduced and its complexity issues are studied in Section 3. We conclude this paper in Section 4.
Background

Propositional logic
Let P = {p 0 , p 1 , . . .} be a finite set of propositional variables and let L P be the propositional language built from P and boolean constants (true) and ⊥ (false) with the usual connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔. Formulas of L P are denoted by φ, ψ etc. A literal is a variable p ∈ P or its negation. 2 P is the set of the valuations for P, with the usual convention that for V ∈ 2 P and p ∈ V , V gives the value true to p if p ∈ V and false otherwise. denotes the classical logical consequence relation.
Let X ⊆ P, 2 X is the set of X-valuations. A partial valuation (for P) is an X-valuation for some X ⊆ P. Partial valuations are denoted by listing all variables of X, with a " + " symbol when the variable is set to be true and a " − " symbol when the variable is set to be false: for instance, let X = {p, q, r}, then the X-valuation V = {p, r} is denoted {+p, −q, +r}. If {P 1 , . . . , P n } is a partition of P and V 1 , . . . , V n are partial valuations, where
Boolean game
Boolean games introduced by Harrenstein et al [17] are zero-sum games with two players, where the strategies available to each player consist in assigning a truth value to each variable in a given subset of P. Bonzon et al [8] give a more general definition of a boolean game with any number of players and not necessarily zero-sum. In this paper we further generalizes boolean games such that the utility of each agent is not necessarily in {0, 1}. Such generalization is reached by representing the goals of each agent as a set of weighted formulas. We call such boolean game weighted boolean game. The idea of using weighted formulas to define utility can be found in many work among which we mention satisfiability game [5] and weighted boolean formula game [23] .
Definition 1 (boolean game). A weighted boolean game is a 4-tuple (Agent, P, π, Goal), where 1. Agent = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents. 2. P is a finite set of propositional variables. 3. π : Agent → 2 P is a control assignment function such that {π (1), . . . , π(n)} forms a partition of P. For each agent i, 2 π(i) is the strategy space of i.
A strategy for agent i is a partial valuation for all the variables i controls. Note that since {π (1), . . . , π(n)} forms a partition of P, a strategy profile S is a valuation for P. In the rest of the paper we make use of the following notation, which is standard in game theory. Let G = (Agent, P, π, Goal) be a weighted boolean game with Agent = {1, . . . , n}, S = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) be a strategy profile. s −i denotes the projection of S on Agent−{i}:
Agents' utilities in weighted boolean games are induced by their goals. For every agent i and every strategy profiles S, u i (S) = Σ{m j : φ j , m j ∈ Goal i , S φ j }. Dominating strategies and pure-strategy Nash equilibria are defined as usual in game theory [24] .
This boolean game is depicted as follows:
Input/output logic
In input/output logic, a norm is an ordered pair of formulas (φ, ψ) ∈ L P × L P , which is read as "given φ, it is obligatory to be ψ". A set of norm N can be viewed as a function from 2 L P to 2 L P such that for a set Φ of formulas, N (Φ) = {ψ ∈ L P : (φ, ψ) ∈ N for some φ ∈ Φ}. A finite set of norms is called a (plain) normative system. Definition 2 (Semantics of input/output logic [21] ). Given a normative system N and a finite set of formulas Φ, out(N, Φ) = Cn(N (Cn(Φ))), where Cn is the consequence relation of propositional logic. 1 Intuitively, the procedure of the semantics is as follows: We first have in hand a set of formulas Φ (call it the input) as a description of the current state. We then close it by logical consequence Cn(Φ). The set of norms, like a deductive machine, accepts this logically closed set and produces a set of formulas N (Cn(Φ)). We finally get the output Cn(N (Cn(Φ))) by applying the logical closure again. ψ ∈ out(N, Φ) is understood as "ψ is obligatory given facts Φ and norms N ".
Example 2 Let p, q, r are propositional variables. Let N = {(p, q), (p∨q, r), (r, p)}. Then out(N, {p}) = Cn(N (Cn({p}))) = Cn({q, r}).
Input/output logic is given a proof theoretic characterization. We say that an ordered pair of formulas is derivable from a set N iff (a, x) is in the least set that extends N and is closed under a number of derivation rules. The following are the rules we need:
-SI (strengthening the input): from (φ, ψ) to (χ, ψ) whenever χ φ.
-WO (weakening the output): from (φ, ψ) to (φ, χ) whenever ψ χ.
-AND (conjunction of output): from (φ, ψ) and (φ, χ) to (φ, ψ ∧ χ).
The derivation system based on the rules SI, WO and AND is denoted as deriv(N ).
Example 3 Let N = {(p ∨ q, r), (q, r → s)}, then (q, s) ∈ deriv(N ) because we have the following derivation
In Makinson and van der Torre [21] , the following soundness and completeness theorem is proved:
Prioritized input/output logic A prioritized normative system N ≥ = (N, ≥) is a finite set of norms together with a priority relation over norms. We assume ≥ to be reflexive and transitive and understand (φ, ψ) ≥ (φ , ψ ) as (φ, ψ) has higher priority than (φ , ψ ). The priority relation is further lifted to priority over sets of norms. Following Parent [25] , we define the lifting as follows:
Definition 3 (output with priorities
2 ). Let N ≥ be a prioritized normative system and Φ be a set of formulas.
Here pref f amily(N ≥ , Φ) is defined via the following steps:
1. maxf amily(N ≥ , Φ) is the set of ⊆-maximal subsets N of N such that out(N , Φ) is consistent. That is, out(N , Φ) is consistent and for all N such that N ⊂ N , out(N , Φ) is not consistent 2. f ilterf amily(N ≥ , Φ) is the set of norms N ∈ maxf amily(N ≥ , Φ) that maximize the output, i.e., that are such that out(N , Φ) ⊂ out(N , Φ) for no N ∈ maxf amily(N ≥ , Φ).
pref f amily(N ≥ , Φ) is the set of -maximal elements of f ilterf amily(N ≥ , Φ).
Permission in input/output logic Philosophically, it is common to distinguish between two kinds of permission: negative permission and positive permission. Negative permission is straightforward to describe: something is negatively permitted according to certain norms iff it is not prohibited by those norms. That is, iff there is no obligation to the contrary. Positive permission is more elusive. For the sake of simplicity, in this paper when only discuss negative permission and leave other types of permission as future work.
Definition 4 (permission)
. Given a prioritized normative system N ≥ and a finite set of formulas Φ, P erm(
Intuitively, φ is permitted iff φ is not forbidden. Since a formula is forbidden iff its negation is obligatory, φ is not forbidden is equivalent to ¬φ is not obligatory.
Complexity theory
Complexity theory is the theory to investigate the time, memory, or other resources required for solving computational problems. In this subsection we briefly review those concepts and results from complexity theory which will be used in this paper. More comprehensive introduction of complexity theory can be found in [4] We assume the readers are familiar with notions like Turing machine and the complexity class P, NP and coNP. Oracle Turing machine and two complexity classes related to oracle Turing machine will be used in this paper.
Definition 5 (oracle Turing machine [4] ). An oracle for a language L is a device that is capable of reporting whether any string w is a member of L. An oracle Truing machine M L is a modified Turing machine that has the additional capability of querying an oracle. Whenever M L writes a string on a special oracle tape it is informed whether that string is a member of L, in a single computation step.
P
N P is the class of problems solvable by a deterministic polynomial time Turing machine with an NP oracle. P N P [O(log n)] only allows O(log n) oracle queries instead of polynomially-many. P N P is the class of problems which can be solved by using the N P oracle only in parallel. Buss and Hay [10] show that P N P coincide with P
, where a fixed number of parallel rounds is allowed. NP N P is the class of problems solvable by a non-deterministic polynomial time Turing machine with an NP oracle. Another name for the class NP N P is Σ 
From boolean game to normative multi-agent system
In recent years, normative multi-agent system [6, 3] arises as a new interdisciplinary academic area bringing together researchers from multi-agent system [27, 32, 31] , deontic logic [14] and normative system [1, 18, 2] . By combining boolean games and norms, we here develop a new approach to normative multi-agent system. Definition 6 (normative multi-agent system). A normative multi-agent system is a triple (G, N ≥ , E) where -G = (Agent, P, π, Goal) is a weighted boolean game.
-N ≥ is a prioritized normative system. -E ⊆ L P is a finite set of formulas representing the environment.
Legal strategy
In a normative multi-agent system, agent's strategies are classified as either legal or illegal. The basic idea is viewing strategies as formulas and using the mechanism of input/output logic to decide whether a formula is permitted.
Definition 7 (legal strategy). Given a normative multi-agent system (G, N ≥ , E), for each agent i, a strategy (+p 1 , . . . , +p m , −q 1 , . . . , −q n ) is legal if
Example 4 Consider the prisoner's dilemma augmented with norms. Let (G, N ≥ , E) be a normative multi-agent system as following:
-G = (Agent, P, π, Goal) is a weighted boolean game with
• Agent = {1, 2},
Therefore {−p} and {−q} are legal while {+p} and {+q} are not.
Having defined the notion legal strategy, a natural question to ask is how complex is it to decide whether a strategy is legal. Theorem 2 gives a first answer to this question. To prove Theorem 2, we need the following lemmas. Lemma 1. Given a normative system N , a finite set of formulas Φ and a formula φ, deciding whether φ ∈ out(N, Φ) is coNP hard and in P N P .
Proof. Concerning the coNP hardness, we prove by reducing the validity problem of propositional logic to our problem. Let φ be an arbitrary formula. Let N = ∅ and Φ = ∅, then φ is a tautology iff φ ∈ Cn( ) iff φ ∈ Cn(N (Cn(Φ))) iff φ ∈ out(N, Φ) Concerning the P N P membership, we prove by giving an oracle Turing machine with oracle SAT , the set of all satisfiable propositional formulas, to solve this problem.
Let
It can be verified that φ ∈ Cn(N (Cn(Φ))) iff the Turing machine returns "accept" and the time complexity of the oracle Turing machine runs in polynomial time and calls the oracle in parallel for 2 rounds. Therefore the problem is in P N P O(1) , which coincides with P N P .
Lemma 2. Given a prioritized normative system N ≥ , a finite set of norms N ⊆ N , a finite set of formulas Φ, deciding whether N ∈ maxf amily(N ≥ , Φ) is coNP hard and in P N P .
Proof. The coNP hardness is easy to prove. Here we focuses on the P N P membership. We prove by giving an oracle Turing machine with oracle SAT to solve this problem.
Let N − N = {(φ 1 , ψ 1 ), . . . , (φ n , ψ n )}.
. . , n}. Otherwise return "reject".
It can be verified that N ∈ maxf amily(N ≥ , Φ) iff the Turing machine returns "accept" and the time complexity of the oracle Turing machine is polynomial.
Lemma 3. Given a prioritized normative system N ≥ , a finite set of norms N ⊆ N , a finite set of formulas Φ, deciding whether N ∈ f ilterf amily(N ≥ , Φ) is coNP hard and in coN P N P = Π p 2 .
Proof. The coNP hardness is easy to prove. Here we focuses on the coN P 2. Guess a strategy profile S 3. Test if S is legal. If no, return "reject" on this branch. Otherwise continue. 4. For each agent i, test if u i (S) < u i (S ). Return "accept" on this branch if for some i, u i (S) < u i (S ). Otherwise return "reject" on this branch.
It can be verified that S is not a legal Nash equilibrium iff the non-deterministic Turing machine returns "accept" on some branch and the time complexity of the Turing machine is polynomial.
Theorem 4. Given a normative multi-agent system (G, N, E). Deciding whether there is a legal Nash equilibrium of G is Σ Proof. The lower bound follows from the fact that deciding whether there is a Nash equilibria for boolean games without norms is Σ P 2 complete [8] . Concerning the upper bound, recall that Σ 
Conclusion
In the present paper we introduce weighted boolean game with prioritized norms. Norms distinguish illegal strategies from legal strategies. Using ideas from (prioritized) input/output logic, legal strategies and legal Nash equilibrium are discussed. After formally presenting the model, we use examples to show that nonoptimal Nash equilibrium can be avoided by making use of norms. We study the complexity issues related to legal strategy and legal Nash equilibrium. Our complexity results are not complete, which leaves rooms for future work. Other natural future work includes using a different input/output logic to reason about norms and using positive permission to define legal strategy.
